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GENERAL AVIATION ACCIDENT LIABILITY
STANDARDS: WHY THE FUSS?
GREGORY P. WELLS
A JOKE PRESENTLY making the rounds in the general
aviation industry is that if the airplane flown by the
Wright brothers at Kitty Hawk was still flying today,
Orville and Wilbur would still be responsible for it under
today's general aviation product liability laws.' This at-
tempt at humor is indicative of the current state of the
general aviation industry. Since the industry's boom
times in the late 1970s, general aircraft delivery has
dropped from 18,000 units delivered in 1978 to 1143
units delivered in 1988.2
Although not entirely to blame, a fair share of this de-
cline is attributable to the increase in the cost of accident
liability insurance.3 Industry wide liability insurance costs
in 1985 were $210 million, an increase of almost nine
I Bradley, Aircraft Manufacturers Hope Congress Faces Product Liability Issue, Wichita
Bus. J., Aug. 28, 1989, at 13, col. 1.
Id. at 16, col. 3.
3 Hearings on H.R. 1307 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Comm. on Public Works
and Transp., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 71-75 (1989) (statement ofJan K. VonFlatern,
General Counsel, Piper Aircraft Corporation) [hereinafter Statement of Von-
Flatern]. But see Hearings on S. 473 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transp., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 92-94 (1987) (statement of the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America) [hereinafter Statement of AOTLA
1987]. S. 473 was introduced in the 100th Congress and was virtually identical to
S. 640 and H.R. 1307 introduced in the 101st Congress. S. 473, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 2911 (1987). "The decline in the demand for general avia-
tion aircraft, we believe, is unrelated to product liability law. Overproduction in
the 1970's, the long useful life of aircraft, the very healthy used plane market and
subsidized foreign competition are the real causes of the industry's sales
problems." Statement of AOTLA 1987, supra, at 94.
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times over the 1978 costs.4 This increase in liability insur-
ance5 has completely driven some manufacturers from the
market,6 while others have dropped liability insurance al-
together, opting for self insurance.7 Still others are
forced to carry only an excess liability policy.8
In an effort to alleviate this problem, both houses of
Congress introduced bills in the 101st Congress to pro-
vide uniform liability standards for general aviation acci-
dents.9 Senate Bill 640 was introduced by Senator
4 Bradley, supra note 1, at 16, col. 4. Liability claims pending against Beech
Aircraft alone increased from $447 million as of January 1, 1984, to over $1.1
billion pending in 1987. Hearings on S. 473 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the
Comm. on Commerce, Science and Tramp., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1987) (statement
of Robert Martin, Martin, Pringle, Oliver, Triplett and Wallace) [hereinafter
Statement of Martin].
Beech Aircraft estimates that its cost for insurance per unit delivered is
$80,000. This does not include the cost of insurance incurred by manufacturers
of components included in the cost of the component delivered to Beech, which is
estimated to be an additional $25,000 per unit delivered. Statement of Martin,
supra note 4. Russ Meyer, Chairman of Cessna Aircraft estimates that the cost of
liability insurance on an $80,000 airplane would be between $40,000 and
$50,000. Bradley, Cessna's Shies Turning Blue After Poor '80s, Wichita Bus. J., Aug.
21, 1989, at 24, col. 3.
6 Cessna Aircraft Company once bragged of "teaching the world to fly." Today
it no longer manufactures single-engine, piston aircraft, largely due to the cost of
liability insurance. According to Russ Meyer, Chairman of Cessna, "[w]e'd like
nothing better [than to re-enter the piston driven general aviation market], but if
nothing changes with respect to product liability costs, it is unlikely that we will
build the piston airplanes." Cessna now concentrates on the business jet market.
Bradley, supra note 5, at 1, col. 4, and at 24, col. 3.
7 When Stuart Millar purchased Piper Aircraft in May 1987, one of the first
things he did was drop liability insurance. Against the Law, The Economist, June
10, 1989, at 66. Piper now fights every claim considered unjustified with a team
of lawyers that has been described as having the disposition of a "junkyard" dog.
Id. If Piper is hit with a massive liability judgment, Mr. Millar has resigned himself
to turning the keys to the company over to the winner. Piper May Still Be Carrying
Excess Baggage, Bus. Week, June 12, 1989, at 76.
8 Beech Aircraft has what amounts to a $50 million deductible for product lia-
bility claims. Bradley, supra note 1, at 16, col. 4. General liability insurance covers
the insured for claims up to its policy limit. Most general liability policies include
a deductible for a specified amount of liability for which the insured is itself re-
sponsible. Excess liability coverage is a separate policy which covers the insured
for claims in excess of the general liability policy limits. Self insurance consists of
the insured insuring itself for claims up to a certain amount, usually significantly
higher than a typical deductible. Often self insurance and excess liability coverage
work together to protect an insured. See generally C. KULP & J. HALL, CASUA.TY
INSURANCE (1968).
9 Similar bills were introduced in two prior sessions of Congress. Bradley, supra
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Kassebaum t0 on March 16, 1989, while House Bill 1307
(the Act) was introduced by Representative Glickman" on
March 8, 1989.12 The stated purpose of this legislation is
to "establish rules of Federal law for determining per-
sonal injury and property damage arising out of general
aviation accidents."13
This comment will analyze and discuss the impact the
Act will have on existing law in the area of general avia-
tion accidents.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE ACT
The scope of the Act is limited exclusively to accidents
involving general aviation aircraft.14 The Act defines gen-
eral aviation aircraft as aircraft which have a maximum
seating capacity of less than 20 people and are not cur-
rently used in scheduled passenger carrying operations.' 5
note 1, at 13, col. 1. In the 100th Congress, the Senate bill went as far as the floor
of the Senate before it was killed by filibuster, while the House bill was killed in
committee. Id. at 16, col. 3.
10 Republican, Kansas.
1 Democrat, Kansas.
12 S. 640, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 1307, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.,
(1989). The bills are virtually identical. This comment will focus on H.R. 1307,
with any material differences between the two noted as necessary. The Product
Liability Reform Act, S. 1400, was also introduced during the 101st Congress. S.
1400 modifies product liability rules for all types of products, not only general
aviation aircraft. S. 1400 differs from H.R. 1307 and S. 640 in three material re-
spects: (1) everyone in the chain of causation is severally liable, no one is jointly
liable; (2) a twenty-five year statute of repose only applies if the injured party is
eligible under worker compensation rules; and (3) punitive damages against the
manufacturer are generally not allowed in aviation accidents if the aircraft was
FAA certified. S. 1400, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., 135 CONG. REc. 8725 (1989).
is H.R. 1307, supra note 12, § 2(b). The congressional findings included in the
bill set out several major reasons why Congress believes the legislation is neces-
sary. Specifically, (1) air transportation is an important component of the nation's
transportation system; (2) the air transportation industry is highly regulated; (3)
general aviation manufacturers and component part manufacturers are ceasing
production due to increasing liability costs; and (4) while the number of injuries
has declined, the amount of damages paid out in liability claims has increased
tremendously. Id. § 2(a).
14 Id. § 721(a).
i Id. § 732(3).
[T]he term 'general aviation aircraft' means any aircraft for which a
type certificate or any airworthiness certificate has been issued by the
Administrator, which, at the time such certificate was originally is-
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Since the Act is limited to general aviation aircraft, it will
not impact liability arising from commercial air carrier
accidents.
Furthermore, the Act will not exclude from liability any
party potentially liable under current law. The Act ap-
plies to general aviation manufacturers, owners and oper-
ators of general aviation aircraft, or anyone that repairs,
maintains, or provides any other support services for gen-
eral aviation aircraft.' 6 A general aviation manufacturer is
a manufacturer of the airframe or engine used in a gen-
eral aviation aircraft or the manufacturer of any system,
component, subassembly, or other part of a general avia-
tion aircraft. 17
The Act sets out three broad standards on which liabil-
ity may be premised: (1) negligence, (2) strict products li-
ability, and (3) warranty. 8 The negligence standard
established by the Act is simply common law negligence.
The Act provides that any person injured in a general avi-
ation accident by the negligence of another, as long as the
negligence is the proximate cause of the injury, may bring
sued, had a maximum seating capacity of fewer than 20 passengers,
and which is not, at the time of the accident, engaged in scheduled
passenger carrying operations as defined in regulations issued under
[the Federal Aviation Act of 19581.
Id.
'1 Id. § 721(a).
The provisions of this subtitle shall apply to any action for damages
for harm arising out of a general aviation accident brought against a
general aviation manufacturer, the owner or operator of a general
aviation aircraft, a person who repairs, maintains, or provides any
other support for a general aviation aircraft, or any other person or
governmental entity.
Id. The senate bill includes actions brought by occupants at the time of a general
aviation accident and nonoccupants that are bringing an action on behalf of such
occupants. S. 640, supra note 12, § 4(e).
17 H.R. 1307, supra note 12, § 732(4). "[Tlhe term 'general aviation manufac-
turer' means -
(A) the builder or manufacturer of the airframe of a general aviation aircraft;
(B) the manufacturer of the engine of a general aviation aircraft; and
(C) the manufacturer of any system, component, subassembly, or other part of
a general aviation aircraft." Id.
,- Id. § 722.
COMMENTS
an action for liability.19
Within the area of strict products liability, the Act
makes two major changes to existing law. First, in order
to hold a person liable for manufacturing or design de-
fects, the product must have been defective at the time the
product left the control of the manufacturer, as judged
against the reasonably feasible design and engineering
standards which existed at the time of manufacture. °
Second, the product must be used in a manner for which
it was designed and manufactured. 2 ' This second change
precludes liability in situations where the aircraft was used
in a manner for which it was not designed or manufac-
tured, eliminating what is commonly known as the
"crashworthiness" doctrine. The Act also codifies the re-
quirements that a manufacturer warn consumers about
dangers the manufacturer is aware of or reasonably
should be aware of, either at the time of the sale or after
the product is sold. 2
Finally, the Act also provides for liability in situations
where an injury arises from a breach of an express
warranty.2
Other major provisions of the Act include the follow-
ing: (1) establishing comparative liability in all general
aviation accidents; (2) limiting the length of time, after the
manufacture of the aircraft, in which an injured person
can bring suit; (3) limiting the admissibility of evidence of
any corrective measures made by the manufacturer which,
if made before the accident, might have prevented the ac-
cident; (4) allowing punitive damages only in situations
where the actions of the responsible party constituted a
conscious and flagrant indifference for the safety of users
of general aviation aircraft; and (5) placing concurrent ju-
risdiction of general aviation accidents with federal and
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state courts.24
Not surprisingly, manufacturers are in support of the
Act.25 Perhaps a little surprising is the fact that two con-
sumer organizations, whose members stand to be injured
by any limitations on liability, are also in support of the
Act. These organizations are the Aircraft Owners and Pi-
lots Association (AOPA) with over 280,000 members, 6
and the National Business Aircraft Association (NBAA)
with over 2900 member companies.27 Both AOPA and
NBAA support the legislation because of their belief that
it will decrease the cost of liability insurance coverage car-
ried by manufacturers, which will, in turn, decrease the
cost of aircraft and thus decrease the cost of flying to their
members.2
The strongest opposition to the Act comes from a
seemingly unlikely opponent, the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America (AOTLA) .29 AOTLA bases its oppo-
2. Id. at 6-7.
2 Eberhart, Suits May Ground Small-Craft Makers: Air Accident Liability Limits
Sought, Kansas City, Mo. Star, July 5, 1989, at 2C, col. 6; see also Statement of
VonFlatern, supra note 3, at 71-75 (statement in support of the Act), and State-
ment of Martin, supra note 4, at 54 (statement in support of the Act).
26 Eberhart, supra note 25, at 2C, col. 5; see also Hearings on H.R. 1307 Before the
Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transp., 10 1st Cong., 1st
Sess. 85 (1989) (statement of John S. Yodice, General Counsel, Aircraft Owners
and Pilots Association, in support of the Act) [hereinafter Statement of Yodice].
217 Hearings on S. 473 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Comm. on Commerce, Sci-
ence and Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1987)(statement of the Na-
tional Business Aircraft Association, Inc.) [hereinafter Statement of NBAA].
28 Statement of Yodice, supra note 26, at 85; Statement of NBAA, supra note 27,
at 100. The AOPA recognizes that its position in support of the Act is in dichot-
omy with the normal position that a consumer group advocates in this kind of
situation.
On the one hand, we are the probable victims of any air crashes
which are due to defective general aviation products .... On the
other hand, we have an interest in the availability, at reasonable cost,
of general aviation products. It is apparent to us that many manu-
facturers and suppliers have curtailed production and others have
gotten out of the general aviation business altogether, principally
due to product liability concerns.
Statement of Yodice, supra note 26, at 85.
29 See generally Hearings on S. 640 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science and Transp., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 65-75 (1989) (statement of
Charles T. Hvass, Jr. of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, in opposition
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sition to the Act on several grounds: (1) the fact that tort
reform historically has been a matter of state concern;30
(2) any incentive to improve aircraft crashworthiness is
eliminated; 3 1 (3) by establishing a statute of repose, man-
ufacturers will be able to avoid liability in situations where
their actions were clearly negligent;3 2 (4) the injection of
negligence standards into strict liability; 3 and, (5) the in-
troduction of comparative negligence will prevent inno-
cent victims from receiving full compensation.34
II. LIABILITY STANDARDS
A. Negligence
The Act provides for recovery in a general aviation acci-
dent to an injured party if the injury is caused by the neg-
ligence of another and the negligence is the proximate
cause of the injury. 5 This negligence standard is the
to the Act) [hereinafter Statement of AOTLA 1989]; Statement of AOTLA 1987,
supra note 3, at 92-94 (statement in opposition to the Act).
- Statement of AOTLA 1989, supra note 29, at 65.
31 Id. at 68. Manufacturers will be able to argue that the aircraft was not being
used for its intended purpose when it crashed and thus avoid liability. Id.
32 Id. at 69-72. For instance, the FAA certified the Cessna 411, a twin engine
aircraft, as being airworthy, although it did not actually meet certification require-
ments. The Act would allow Cessna to escape liability if the fact that the aircraft
failed certification was not discovered within the time allowed by the statute of
repose. Id. Every operating civilian aircraft must have an airworthiness certificate
issued by the FAA. 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1423(c), 1430 (1988). See generally 14 C.F.R.
§ 23 (1990) (airworthiness standards for normal, utility, acrobatic and commuter
airplanes).
- Id. at 70. A plaintiff would have to show not only that the aircraft was unrea-
sonably dangerous, but also that a reasonable manufacturer would have built or
designed the aircraft differently. Id.
34 Id. at 72-73. The abolition ofjoint and several liability will make collection of
damages by the victim extremely difficult. One party liable for damages may have
gone out of business or may not be subject to judgment. The joint and several
liability provisions of the Act will make it impossible to collect 100% of the judg-
ment from any tortfeasor not completely at fault (unless the harm is due to a
component part, in which situations the manufacturer of the airframe is jointly
and severally liable with the manufacturer of the component), thus reducing the
victim's recovery in situations where a joint tortfeasor is unable to pay. Id.
35 H.R. 1307, supra note 12, § 722(a). "Any person claiming damages from
harm arising out of a general aviation accident may bring an action for damages
against a party and may recover damages from that party if that party was negli-
gent and such negligence is a proximate cause of the claimant's harm." Id.
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same standard applied in products liability actions in gen-
eral, and is also the same standard currently utilized in
aviation cases.3 6
To prove negligence in an aviation case, the plaintiff
must show that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff,
the defendant breached this duty, and the defendant's
breach proximately caused an injury to the plaintiff.3 7
The breach may occur during the manufacture 38 or design
of the aircraft.3 9 As in other products liability negligence
actions, privity between the manufacturer and the injured
claimant is not required. °
36 Haskell, Products Liability--An Update For The Defendant, 1973 A.B.A. SEC. INS.,
NEGL. & COMPENSATION L. 87.
37 Id.
38 Carter Carburetor Corp. v. Riley, 186 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1951) (negligent
manufacture of aircraft fuel pump); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 395 (1964).
A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the manufac-
ture of a chattel which, unless carefully made, he should recognize as
involving an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to those
who use it for a purpose for which the manufacturer should expect it
to be used and to those whom he should expect to be endangered by
its probable use, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to
them by its lawful use in a manner and for a purpose for which it is
supplied.
Id
39 Moorhead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l, Inc., 828 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1987)
(negligent design of an airspeed indicator); Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
324 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. I11. 1971) (negligent design of a thrust reverser system); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (1964).
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which
makes it dangerous for the uses for which it is manufactured is sub-
ject to liability to others whom he should expect to use the chattel or
to be endangered by its probable use for physical harm caused by his
failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan or
design.
Id.
4 Vrooman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 183 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1950) (foreseeabil-
ity of the consequences creates the duty); Middleton v. United Aircraft Corp., 204
F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). A person without direct contractual relations to the
manufacturer can recover for his negligence. The manufacturer should realize
that in the ordinary course of events, persons other than the buyer will share the
danger. Id. at 858. Since 1916, courts have used a foreseeability test. If the injury
to the plaintiff was foreseeable, privity of contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant is not necessary. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111
N.E. 1050 (1916).
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A classic example of negligence in an aviation case is
found in Northwest Airlines v. Glenn L. Martin Co.4 1 In North-
west Airlines, a commercial airliner crashed as it ap-
proached Minneapolis, Minnesota during a
thunderstorm.42 The subsequent investigation revealed
that a wing spar, broken because of metal fatigue, caused
the aircraft to crash.43 The airline brought an action
against the manufacturer for negligent design and manu-
facture in the construction of the aircraft.44 The airline
alleged that negligent design and construction of the wing
spars made them unreasonably susceptible to metal fa-
tigue and claimed that if the manufacturer had exercised
due care, the accident would not have occurred. 45 The
Sixth Circuit held that the evidence presented a question
of negligence which was properly submitted to the jury.46
The case, however, was ultimately remanded due to im-
proper jury instructions regarding contributory
negligence.4 7
A manufacturer may also be liable for negligence in
connection with the use of a component manufactured by
someone else.48 In Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown,49 an action
for negligence was brought against the manufacturer of
the aircraft.50 The cause of the accident was the failure of
a component part manufactured by another party.5 The
4' 224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956).
42 Id. at 122-23.
41 Id. at 123.
44 Id. at 121. "From this thick overlay of factual controversy emerge familiar
questions of ordinary care, proximate cause . Id. at 122.
45 Id. at 124.
46 Id. "The effect of the voluminous evidence was certainly to leave the ques-
tion of Martin's lack of ordinary care in a state upon which reasonable minds
could differ." Id.
4 id. at 131.
48 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 comment g (1964). "[A] manufac-
turer who incorporates a part made by another manufacturer into his finished
product should exercise reasonable care to ascertain not only the material out of
which the part is made but also the plan under which it is made." Id.
49 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961).
o Id.
51 Id. at 312. The accident was caused by the explosion of an alternator, one of
four used to provide electricity to the aircraft. Id.
1991] 903
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court held that it was irrelevant that the part causing the
accident was not manufactured by the manufacturer of the
aircraft.52 The manufacturer "[is] chargeable with the
duty to exercise reasonable care in the design and con-
struction of the component . . . which is installed in its
manufactured product. '5 3
In an effort to reduce the plaintiff's burden of proof on
negligence issues, some courts have allowed the use of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (res ipsa).5 4 Res ipsa may be used
in some situations to draw the inference that the manufac-
turer was negligent in the manufacture of the aircraft.
Before a plaintiff may use res ipsa, he must show: (1) that
the alleged defect existed at the time the aircraft left the
control of the manufacturer; (2) the defect would not or-
dinarily occur in the absence of negligence; and (3) the
accident was not the result of the conduct of the plain-
tiff.56 The inherent difficulty in satisfying the first element
of res ipsa proves to be the biggest obstacle for many plain-
tiffs. 57 Proving that the defect existed at the time the air-
52 Id. at 313.
If Thompson [the manufacturer of the component] failed to exercise
reasonable care in the design and manufacture of that component,
or if Thompson or Boeing [the manufacturer of the aircraft] or both
failed to exercise reasonable care in inspecting or testing the compo-
nent, or if Boeing failed to exercise reasonable care in installing the
component in the B-52 bomber or in warning the Air Force of any




54 North American Aviation, Inc. v. Hughes, 247 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 914 (1958) (res ipsa used in a negligence action for an unknown
defect in aircraft); Becker v. American Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp 839 (S.D.N.Y
1961) (res ipsa used in negligence action for defective altimeters).
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1964).
56 Tompkins v. Northwestern Union Trust Co., 198 Mont. 170, 176-77, 645
P.2d 402, 406 (1982).
5 Podhurst, Duties of Manufacturers and Reassemblers: Plaintifs' Positions, 1973
A.B.A. SEC. INS., NEGL. & COMPENSATION L. 178. "[Tjhe 'control' required to be
shown is simply 'control' at the time the problem or shortcoming arose." Id.; see
also Becker, 200 F. Supp at 843. But cf. Webb v. Zurich Ins. Co., 194 So. 2d 436
(La. Ct. App. 1966) (use of res ipsa denied when aircraft was airworthy when deliv-
ered), rev'd on other grounds, 251 La. 558, 205 So. 2d 398 (1967).
craft or component left the control of the manufacturer
remains a signficant burden.
The negligence standard set out in the Act makes no
changes to the rules of negligence as they currently exist.
Therefore, the negligence rules discussed above would
continue unaffected if the Act becomes law.
B. Strict Liability
The Act also provides for recovery under a theory of
strict liability in tort.5 8 This section of the Act contains
two of the more controversial changes to the existing law.
The first is the allowance of a "state of the art" defense.5 9
The other is the limitation of liability to only those situa-
tions where the aircraft was being used in the manner for
which it was designed and manufactured.6 °
The doctrine of strict liability was created to allow a
plaintiff to recover against a manufacturer for a defective
product without proving that the manufacturer engaged
in culpable conduct.6' Today a majority ofjurisdictions in
the United States have adopted strict liability in tort.62
The doctrine of strict liability is embodied in Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.63
5s H.R. 1307, supra note 12, § 722(b).
Any person claiming damages for harm arising out of a general avia-
tion accident may bring an action for damages against a general avia-
tion manufacturer of a product and may recover damages from that
general aviation manufacturer if -
(A) the product, when it left the control of the manufacturer, was
in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended
purpose, according to engineering and manufacturing practices
which were reasonably feasible;
(B) the defective condition is a proximate cause of the claimant's
harm; and
(C) the general aviation aircraft was being used at the time of the





61 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILrry § 16:4 (3d ed. 1987).
62 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAw § 7.04[l] (rev. ed. 1990).
63 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964). "One who sells any prod-
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In order to recover under current strict liability stan-
dards, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing the fol-
lowing: (1) the product was defective; (2) the defect
existed at the time the product left the control of the man-
ufacturer; (3) the defect was not contemplated by the
user; (4) the defect made the product unreasonably dan-
gerous; and (5) the injury to the plaintiff was caused by
the defect. 64 A product may be defective as the result of a
manufacturing defect or a design defect. 65 As in negli-
gence cases, privity between the manufacturer and the
user is not required.66
Modern courts have spent a lot of time attempting to
define the phrase "defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous" found in Section 402A.67 Some jurisdictions
hold that the two parts of the phrase, "defective condi-
tion" and "unreasonably dangerous," are synonymous. 68
Others believe that the two phrases establish two stan-
dards of proof: (1) the product is defective, and (2) the
defect constitutes an unreasonable danger.69
The initial approach adopted by a majority of the courts
in determining the meaning of a "defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous" was a consumer expectation test
uct in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to
his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer, or to his property ...." Id.
Manos, 324 F. Supp at 484; see also Rigby v. Beech Aircraft Co., 548 F.2d 288
(10th Cir. 1977).
65 See, e.g., Meil v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1981) (design
defect in seatbelt, fuel supply system, and fire extinguisher holder); O'Keefe v.
Boeing Co., 335 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (manufacturing defect in weld);
Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978) (design defect in
engine carburetor); see also AMERICAN LAw OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 17:3 (3d ed.
1987).
Manos, 324 F. Supp. at 483.
67 W. TURLEY, AvIATioN LITIGATION § 1.04 (1986).
- Id.; see also Ross v. Up-Right, Inc., 402 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1968) (only requires
unreasonably dangerous); Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d
562 (Law Div. 1973) (product only required to be defective).
- W. TURLEY, supra, note 67, § 1.04; see also Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544
F.2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 1976); Kleve v. General Motors Corp., 210 N.W.2d 568,
570-71 (Iowa 1973).
set out in the comment to the Restatement.7 ° Under this
test, a defective condition is defined as a "condition not
contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be un-
reasonably dangerous to him."'7 "Unreasonably danger-
ous" is defined as "[t]he article sold must be dangerous to
an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary consumer who purchases it ....
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania applied the con-
sumer expectation test in Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter
Corp.,7s to determine whether a defect in a helicopter
which prevented the pilot from using autorotation in case
of engine failure was an unreasonably dangerous defec-
tive condition. 74 The court held that the ordinary con-
sumer would expect that in the case of engine failure, the
pilot of the helicopter would have enough time to place
the helicopter in autorotation in order to land without
crashing. 75 Since the design of the helicopter did not al-
low the use of autorotation as quickly as consumers would
expect it to, this constituted an unreasonably dangerous
defective condition. 76
The risk-utility test, originally adopted in the California
case Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. 77 is another frequently
used test to determine what constitutes an unreasonably
dangerous defective product. 78  This test considers
whether the risk of harm from the product in its defective
condition outweighs its utility. Factors considered by a
court when weighing the risk versus the utility of the
product include (1) the gravity of the danger; (2) the like-
70 W. TURLEY, supra note 67, § 1.07.
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1964).
72 Id. comment i.
73 219 Pa. Super. 479, 281 A.2d 707 (1971).
74 Id. at 479, 281 A.2d at 709. Autorotation consists of allowing the rotor
blades to rotate free of the engine, combined with the pitch of the helicopter,
creating enough lift to glide to a landing. W. TURLEY, supra note 67, § 3.02.
75 Berkebi/e, 219 Pa. Super. at 479, 281 A.2d at 709.
76 Id.; see also Bruce, 544 F.2d at 442 (consumer expectation test used to deter-
mine whether design of seats was an unreasonably dangerous defective
condition).
77 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
78 Id. at 431-32, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
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lihood of the danger; (3) the cost and feasibility of a safer
design; and (4), the adverse consequences of adopting the
safer design.79
In Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp. ,80 the Supreme Court of
Oregon applied the risk-utility test to determine whether
a carburetor which iced up upon entering a cloud was an
unreasonably dangerous defect.8  The court realized
that, in some situations, the remote probability of injury
resulting from the design is outweighed by the utility of
the product in the defective condition. As a result, the
court held that the manufacturer was not responsible for
any injury arising from the defect.8 2 The court also recog-
nized that in certain situations a change in design which
increases safety might nevertheless render the product's
utility worthless. Under those situations, the manufac-
turer would likewise not be liable." The court ultimately
reversed and remanded the case because there was no evi-
dence of a safer alternative design which could support
the lower court's finding against the manufacturer under a
risk-utility theory. 4
A minority of jurisdictions follow the pro-plaintiff Cali-
fornia rule as set out in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.8 5 The
Cronin rule provides that a plaintiff is only required to
show a defective condition proximately causing an in-
jury.86 The plaintiff is not required to show that the de-
fect made the product unreasonably dangerous. The
Cronin court was concerned that proof of an unreasonably
dangerous defect injects principles of negligence into
79 W. TURLEY, supra note 67, § 1.09.
8o 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1987).
a' Id.
82 282 Or. at 61, 577 P.2d at 1325. "The manner of injury may be so fortuitous
and the chances of injury occurring so remote that it is reasonable to sell the
product despite the danger." Id. (citation omitted).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 61, 577 P.2d at 1327-28.
- 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).




The introduction of "state of the art" into strict liability
analysis under the Act provides an absolute defense for
determining an unreasonably dangerous defective condi-
tion under the consumer expectation test and the risk-
utility test.8 9
Since a consumer can expect no more than "state of the
art" at any given time, "state of the art" will always meet
the consumer expectation test.90 A similar result is
reached under the risk-utility test. When analyzing a de-
fect under risk-utility, some courts consider whether any
feasible, safer, alternatives exist.91 The term "state of the
art" implies that the technique employed is the best way,
currently feasible, to accomplish the desired result. If that
is the case, there are no better alternatives. Thus, a man-
ufacturer who can show that the method used was "state
of the art" at the time the aircraft was manufactured will
also satisfy the risk-utility test and avoid liability.92
There is already considerable controversy surrounding
the injection of the "state of the art" defense into strict
liability. 93 The controversy stems from the fact that "state
of the art" injects negligence principles into strict liability,
a Id. at 132, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442. Requiring the plaintiff to
prove an unreasonably dangerous defect "has burdened the plaintiff with an ele-
ment that rings of negligence." Id.; see also McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 82 Cal.
App. 3d 1005, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1978) (application of Cronin in an aviation lia-
bility case).
89 H.R. 1307, supra note 12, § 722(b)(1)(A).
90 "State of the art" can never be a defense in a manufacturing defect case be-
cause a manufacturing defect is a mistake made in the manufacturing process.
9, See supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text.
92 The "state of the art" defense does not need to be considered under the
Cronin theory discussed earlier. The Act specifically provides that the product be
"in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous" (the same standard as estab-
lished in § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts). Thus a court would be
precluded from using the Cronin standard that a plaintiff merely has to show the
product was defective and proximately caused the injury and not that the defect
rendered the product unreasonably dangerous.
93 See Robb, A Practical Approach to Use of State of The Art Evidence in Strict Products
Liability Cases, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 9-13 (1982). The majority of the jurisdictions
in the United States allow the admission of "state of the art" evidence as a factor
to be considered in strict liability cases. W. TURLEY, supra note 67, § 2.15.
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where the primary concern is not the amount of care exer-
cised by the manufacturer but merely whether the product
is defective. 94
In Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp. ,95 the Tenth Circuit
considered the "state of the art" defense in connection
with the use of the consumer expectation test.96 The case
arose from the crash of an aircraft that was eighteen years
old.97 During the crash, seats broke loose from the floor
and blocked the exit.98 A fire then broke out.99 A plain-
tiff's expert testified at trial that, at the time of the crash,
there were seats in use in some aircraft that would not
have broken loose and blocked the exit.'t ° The defense
countered with evidence that the seats were "state of the
art" technology as it existed in the year the aircraft was
manufactured.' 0 The court held that the "state of the
art" evidence helped determine the expectation of the
consumer and since the plaintiff failed to present any con-
trary evidence as to the consumer's expectation, the
"state of the art" evidence was properly admitted and
considered by the trial court in granting summary judg-
ment for the manufacturer. 0 2
The Act contemplates another major change to existing
law under the doctrine of strict liability. The Act provides
that before a manufacturer can be held responsible for an
accident caused by a defective aircraft, the aircraft must
- Robb, supra note 93, at 9-13.
9s 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976).
96 Id. "State of the art" has also been considered under a risk-utility test. See
McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1983).
The court considered that among the relevant factors in applying the risk-utility
test is whether any feasible alternatives exist. Id. at 210, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 767. To
determine whether any feasible alternatives exist, it seems reasonable that evi-
dence as to whether the design was "state of the art" would be relevant. Id. at
210, 195 Cal. Rptr. 767.





02 Id. at 447. "A consumer would not expect a Model T to have the safety
features which are incorporated in automobiles made today. The same expecta-
tion applies to airplanes." Id.
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have been in use "at the time of the accident for a purpose
and in a manner for which it was designed and manufac-
tured."' 10 3 This is known as "intended use." Since an air-
craft crash is foreseeable, but definitely not intended,
manufacturers have no duty under the Act to insure that
their aircraft are "crashworthy."'' 0 4 Predicating liability
on whether the aircraft was being used in a manner in-
tended at the time of the accident completely eliminates
the crashworthiness doctrine.
The rule that manufacturers have a duty to construct
their products to guard against foreseeable misuse by the
consumer of the product was first established in Larsen v.
General Motors Corp. 105 In Larsen, the Eighth Circuit recog-
nized that a manufacturer did not have a duty to build an
accident-proof product, but that it does have a duty to use
reasonable care in the design of an automobile to avoid
subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk in the case of
collision.10 6 The court rejected the narrow rule that the
manufacturer is only responsible for an injury incurred
while the automobile is being used in a manner for which
it was designed and manufactured.10 7
A majority of jurisdictions have adopted the
crashworthiness doctrine originally established in Lar-
sen.' 0 8 In Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp. ,109 a
United States district court applied the crashworthiness
,os H.R. 1307, supra note 12, § 722(b)(1)(C).
-04 This is the rule in strict liability cases. Under the Act a manufacturer is liable
for the crashworthiness of the aircraft if the manufacturer's actions constituted
negligence. See supra notes 35-57 and accompanying text.
los 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
1-o Id. at 502.
[U]nder the present state of the art an automobile manufacturer is
under no duty to design an accident-proof vehicle or even one that
floats on water, but such manufacturer is under a duty to use reason-
able care in the design of its vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to
an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision. Collisions
with or without fault of the user are clearly foreseeable by the manu-
facturer and are statistically inevitable.
Id.
107 Id.
,o1 See W. TURLEY, supra note 67, § 1.15 (list of states that have adopted the
crashworthiness doctrine).
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doctrine to an aircraft manufacturer."r 0 The plaintiff al-
leged that his injuries incurred during the crash were ag-
gravated by the defective design of the aircraft."' The
court stated that a manufacturer was not responsible for
injuries resulting from the misuse of his product unless
such misuse was foreseeable."12 The court went on to say
that, like an automobile collision, an aircraft crash was
foreseeable. "13
The introduction of "intended use" into strict liability
under the Act completely eliminates the "crashworthi-
ness" doctrine except in situations of negligence or ex-
press warranty."I4 Thus, a plaintiff will be able to recover
for injuries caused by the manufacturer's failure in con-
nection with a secondary collision only if he can prove
negligence or breach of warranty. Eliminating the
"crashworthiness doctrine" in strict liability actions shifts
the more onerous burden of proving negligence or
breach of an express warranty back to the plaintiff, and
thus returning plaintiffs to the same position they were in
before the advent of strict liability.
C. Failure to Provide Adequate Warnings or Instructions
The Act also provides for recovery by an injured plain-
tiff when a manufacturer fails to provide adequate warn-
ings or instructions, even after the aircraft is sold, and
such failure is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's in-
jury." 5 This duty already exists at common law and has
1- 506 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Mont. 1981), aft'don other grounds, 701 F.2d 85 (9th
Cir. 1983).
110 Id.
11 Id. at 1004.
112 Id. at 1097.
1 Id. at 1098. Misuse of a product, however, is the result of culpable conduct
on the part of the plaintiff; therefore, damages should be apportioned accord-
ingly. Id.; see also McGee, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 1005, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 694 (manufac-
turer is responsible under strict liability for defective product which causes injury
in a secondary accident situation).
"4 For a discussion of negligence, see supra notes 35-57 and accompanying text;
for a discussion of warranty, see also infra notes 135-141 and accompanying text.
11 H.R. 1307, supra note 12, § 722(b)(2). An injured plaintiff:
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been incorporated into the Restatement." 6
In Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp. "M the Superior
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the manufacturer of a
helicopter liable for its failure to provide adequate warn-
ing of a dangerous characteristic." 8 The characteristic in
question was the difficulty in placing the helicopter in
autorotation if the engine failed in climbing flight." 9 The
flight manual for the helicopter discussed in detail
autorotation during cruising flight (the least dangerous
situation), but failed to mention the difficulty of autorota-
tion during climbing flight (the most dangerous
situation). 20
The court recognized that the failure to provide ade-
quate warnings could constitute a defective product under
may recover damages from that general aviation manufacturer if -
(A) at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer,
the manufacturer -
(i) knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
known, about a danger connected with the product that caused
the claimant's harm; and
(ii) failed to provide the warnings or instructions that a person
exercising reasonable care would have provided with respect to
the danger which caused the harm alleged by the claimant, unless
those warnings or instructions, if provided, would not have mate-
rially affected the conduct of the product user; or
(B) after the product left the control of the general aviation man-
ufacturer, the manufacturer -
(i) knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
known, about the danger which caused the claimant's harm; and
(ii) failed to take reasonable steps to provide warnings or in-
structions, after the manufacture of the product, which would have
been provided by a person exercising reasonable care, unless
those warnings or instructions, if provided, would not have mate-
rially affected the conduct of the product user;
and the failure to provide warnings or instructions described in sub-
paragraph (A) or (B) is a proximate cause of the claimant's harm.
Id.
116 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1964) "In order to
prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be re-
quired to give directions or warning, on the container, as to its use." Id.; see also id.
comment h (a product is defective if sold without an adequate warning of any
inherent dangers).
117 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1975).
- Id., 337 A.2d at 902-903.
119 Id.
120 Id. 337 A.2d at 903.
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a strict liability theory.' 2 ' The court emphasized that the
"reasonable man" standard does not govern questions re-
garding what constitutes a necessary instruction or warn-
ing.' 22  The sole question for the jury is whether the
manufacturer provided the user with adequate instruc-
tions and warnings to make the product safe. 123
A manufacturer also has a duty to warn consumers of
defects that the manufacturer becomes aware of after the
sale of the product. 124 In Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp.,15 an aircraft manufacturer was held liable
for a crash resulting from engine difficulties. 1 6 The evi-
dence showed that the manufacturer was aware of the
problem before the accident occurred, but failed to take
any action to remedy the problem. 27 The court held that
the manufacturer had a duty to correct the problem, if
feasible, or if not feasible, at least to provide the con-
sumer with adequate warnings.12
Presently, actions for failure to warn may be brought
under either a negligence or strict products liability the-
ory. 129 Failure to warn cases brought under a negligence
121 Id. "A 'defective condition' is not limited to defects in design or manufac-
ture .... A seller must give such warning and instructions as are required to in-
form the user or consumer of the possible risks and inherent limitations of his
product. Id. at 902 (citations omitted).
122 Id.
12 Id. In determining whether the instructions or warnings are adequate, "[tihe
jury should view the relative degrees of danger associated with use of the product
since a greater degree of danger requires a greater degree of protection." Id.
124 DeVito v. United Airlines, 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951) (failure to warn
users of potential carbon dioxide hazard after aircraft was in use); see also Walton
v. Avco Corp., 383 Pa. Super. 518, 557 A.2d 372 (1989) (failure to warn helicop-
ter users of an engine design defect discovered after sale).
125 411 F.2d 451 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969).
126 Id. at 452.
127 Id. at 453.
128 Id.
It is clear that after such a product has been sold and dangerous
defects in design have come to the manufacturer's attention, the
manufacturer has a duty either to remedy these or, if complete rem-
edy is not feasible, at least to give users adequate warnings and in-
structions concerning methods for minimizing the danger.
Id.
Id1 See id. (failure to warn under a negligence theory); Berkebile, 462 Pa. at 83,
337 A.2d at 893 (failure to warn constitutes a defective product under a strict
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theory impose a reasonableness standard for a manufac-
turer's failure to warn.1 30 Courts do not agree on whether
a failure to warn under a strict liability theory imposes this
same reasonableness standard.13 1 The Act settles the dis-
pute by imposing a reasonableness standard on a manu-
facturer's failure to warn. 3 2  Thus, the failure of a
manufacturer to warn of a dangerous condition of its
product, under the Act, will be judged under a reasona-
bleness standard. If a manufacturer is unaware of any
danger, and reasonably should not be aware, the manu-
facturer will not be responsible for any harm created by
its failure to provide an adequate warning.
The Act also provides a defense to a manufacturer if it
is shown that the warning or instruction would not have
altered the conduct of the product user.13 3 If a manufac-
turer can show that a warning or instruction would have
been ignored, the plaintiff cannot hold the manufacturer
liable for its failure to warn.13 4
D. Warranty
Finally, the Act establishes liability for the breach of ex-
press warranties.13 5 Section 2-313 of the Uniform Com-
product liability theory); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1964)
(negligent failure to warn); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comments j,
h (1964) (failure to warn constitutes a defective product).
- Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, 707 S.W.2d 371, 382-83 (Mo. 1986); see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1964).
13, See, e.g., Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980)
(reasonableness standard applied under strict liability for failure to warn);
Berkebile, 462 Pa. at 83, 337 A.2d 893 (reasonableness standard denied under strict
liability for failure to warn).
132 The pertinent provision is quoted supra note 115.
133 See supra note 115.
'- A defendant is hard pressed to show that warnings or instructions would
have been ignored by the user of the product.
,s H.R. 1307, supra note 12, § 722(b)(3).
Any person claiming damages for harm arising out of a general avia-
tion accident may bring an action for damages against a general avia-
tion manufacturer of a product and may recover damages from that
general aviation manufacturer if -
(A) the manufacturer made an express warranty with respect to
the product;
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mercial Code (U.C.C.) governs the creation of express
warranties.' 3 6 Section 2-313 provides that express war-
ranties are created in three different ways: (1) any affirma-
tion of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
relating to the goods which becomes part of the basis for
the bargain; (2) any description of the goods which be-
comes part of the basis for the bargain; and (3) any sam-
ple or model of the goods which becomes part of the basis
for the bargain. 3 7 An express warranty does not have to
be created by contract; it may arise from an advertisement
or brochure. '3 8
Although the Act does not change existing law as it re-
lates to express warranties, it does preclude recovery
under an implied warranty. Presently, the U.C.C. recog-
nizes implied warranties in section 2-314
(merchantability) and section 2-315 (fitness for a specific
purpose).' 39  The use of a warranty theory does not re-
quire the plaintiff to show that the manufacturer's actions
were negligent or that the defective product was unrea-
sonably dangerous. The plaintiff merely has to show that
(B) the warranty relates to that aspect of the product which
caused the harm;
(C) the product failed to conform to the warranty; and
(D) the failure of the product to conform to the warranty is a
proximate cause of the claimant's harm.
Id.
136 U.C.C. § 2-313 (1988). Section 2-313 has been adopted in all states except
Louisiana.
137 Id.
138 Westric Battery Co. v. Standard Elec. Co., 482 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir. 1973)
(advertising materials, trade publications, and technical publications regarding
quality are part of warranty); Select Pork, Inc. v. Babcock Swine, Inc., 640 F.2d
147 (8th Cir. 1981) (description in brochure becomes part of warranty).
-9 U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (1988) "Unless excluded or modified... a warranty
that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." d. § 2-314(1). In order to
be merchantable, among other things, the goods must be fit for the ordinary pur-
pose for which they are used. Id. § 2-324(2)(c)
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the
buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified . . . an implied
warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
U.C.C. § 2-315 (1988).
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the product was not fit for its intended use.' 40 This eases
the plaintiff's burden of proof. Undoubtedly, the elimina-
tion of implied warranties will create at least a small ripple
on the aviation liability front. t4 1
III. OTHER PROVISIONS
A. Airworthiness Directives
The Act provides an absolute defense for manufactur-
ers if an airworthiness directive 42 has been issued, and if
by complying with the directive, the defect would have
been corrected prior to any injury. 143 Airworthiness di-
rectives are issued by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) when it determines that an unsafe condition ex-
ists. 4 4 An aircraft is allowed to operate only if it is in
compliance with all airworthiness directives.
45
Presently, violation of an airworthiness directive by a
plaintiff may constitute negligence per se and thus, in
those jurisdictions which treat contributory negligence as
a complete bar to recovery, violation of an airworthiness
directive would preclude any recovery for the plaintiff.
46
140 Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist. v. Westinghouse
Elec., 143 Ariz. 368, 694 P.2d 198, 206-07 (Ariz. 1984).
141 See Krause v. Sud-Aviation, Societe Nationale de Constructions Aeronauti-
ques, 301 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (implied warranty that product will not be
harmful under ordinary use), aff'd on other grounds, 413 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1969);
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963) (implied warranty of fitness of airplane for contemplated
use).
142 The senate bill includes service bulletins issued by the manufacturer. S. 640,
supra note 12, § 5(c).
,4- H.R. 1307, supra note 12, § 722(c).
[A] general aviation manufacturer shall not be liable if such manu-
facturer proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
(1) the defective condition could have been corrected by compli-
ance with action described in an airworthinegs directive issued by the
Administrator; and
(2) such directive was issued at a reasonable time before the date
of the accident and after the product left the control of the general
aviation manufacturer.
Id.
144 49 U.S.C. app. § 1421(a) (1988); 14 C.F.R. § 39.3 (1990).
145 14 C.F.R. § 39.3.
146 See Fisher v. Bell Helicopter Co., 403 F. Supp. 1165 (D.D.C. 1975) (failure
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In jurisdictions employing comparative responsibility, the
act of violation is merely a factor when apportioning fault
between the parties. Somewhat inconsistently, the Act
treats the violation of an airworthiness directive as negli-
gence per se under a contributory negligence system,
completely denying recovery to a person operating an air-
craft in violation of an airworthiness directive. This pro-
vides a huge escape for manufacturers. Completely
denying recovery to a plaintiff operating an aircraft in vio-
lation of an airworthiness directive is inconsistent with the
Act's comparative responsibility provisions which man-
date the use of comparative responsibility in all other
situations. 147
B. Comparative Responsibility
The Act establishes the use of comparative responsibil-
ity in all general aviation accident cases.' 48 Comparative
responsibility involves the apportionment of liability and
damages between the parties to the suit. 49 Under a pure
comparative responsibility system, a plaintiff is able to re-
cover from a defendant the defendant's share of liability
regardless of the plaintiff's share of responsibility. 5 0
Under a modified comparative responsibility system, if the
fault attributable to the plaintiff exceeds a certain percent-
age, the plaintiff is denied any recovery.' 5 ' The Act
by owner to follow requirements of airworthiness directive precluded owner's re-
covery from manufacturer for defective product). But cf. Beck by Chain v. Thomp-
son, 818 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1987) (violation of airworthiness directive was not
negligence per se in an action against the violator, when the purpose of the air-
worthiness directive was to inform the pilot of a certain condition of which he was
already aware).
147 See infra notes 148-162 and accompanying text.
148 H.R. 1307, supra note 12, § 723(a). "All actions governed by this subtitle
shall be governed be the principles of comparative responsibility." Id.
,49 Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 424-26 (Tex. 1984).
-0 Id. at 428-29. Thus, under a pure system, if the plaintiff were 99% at fault,
he could still recover from the defendant the 1% the defendant was at fault. Id.
5, Id. Thus, if the jurisdiction has adopted a modified system with a threshold
of 50%, and the plaintiff's fault is 50% or greater, the plaintiff will recover noth-
ing. Id.
adopts a pure comparative system.'5 2  Most jurisdictions
have adopted a modified system. 53
A few jurisdictions continue to follow the rule of con-
tributory negligence.'" The problem with contributory
negligence is that it is an all or nothing approach. If the
plaintiff is the least bit contributorily negligent, he recov-
ers nothing.'5 5 Most jurisdictions recognize the inequities
of denying recovery to a plaintiff that is only slightly negli-
gent when the defendant is responsible for the remaining
fault either through negligence, strict liability, or war-
ranty. Other jurisdictions recognize comparative respon-
sibility as a defense, but do not allow its use in strict
liability cases.' 56 Still other jurisdictions see no theoreti-
cal problem with applying comparative responsibility in
strict liability cases. 57
In Butuad v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc. ,"'8 the
Alaska Supreme Court applied comparative responsibility
to a strict liability suit.' 59 The court did not interpret
strict liability as being absolute liability, and thus refused
to hold a manufacturer an "insurer of his product with
respect to all harm generated by its use.' °6 0  The court
felt that in situations where the defendant is responsible
12 H.R. 1307, supra note 12, § 723(a). "Comparative responsibility attributed
to the claimant's conduct shall not bar recovery in such an action, but shall reduce
any damages awarded to the claimant in an amount proportionate to the responsi-
bility of the claimant." Id.
,- See W. TURLEY, supra note 67, app. C, for a table of states adopting compara-
tive responsibility.
- Marley v. Kirby, 271 S.C. 122, 245 S.E.2d 604 (1978) (comparative negli-
gence statute is unconstitutional); Street v. Calvert, 541 S.W.2d 576 (Tenn. 1976)
(Tennesse Supreme Court declines to adopt comparative negligence).
15& 57A Am. JuR. 2d Negligence § 960 (1989).
- See, Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (comparative
responsibility denied by statute in strict liability cases); West v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976) (comparative responsibility does not apply in strict
product liability actions if the fault of the plaintiff is his failure to discover the
defect or guard against it); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353
(Okla. 1974) (comparative responsibility only applies in negligence actions).
1-7 See, e.g., Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975);
Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740 (D. Kan. 1978).
158 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976).
159 Id.
a- Id. at 45.
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for producing a defective product, the plaintiff is never-
theless responsible for his own actions which contributed
to the accident.' 6 ' The court also saw no violation of the
public policy reasons inherent in strict liability by allowing
comparative responsibility. 62
With the passage of the Act, all confusion as to when
comparative responsibility applies and when it does not is
eliminated. Jurisdictions will no longer have a choice of
whether or not to apply it to strict liability cases, or even
whether to apply it at all. Comparative responsibility will
apply across the board, in cases brought in negligence,
strict liability, or warranty, for recovery in general aviation
accidents.
C. Joint and Several Liability
Another of the more controversial provisions of the Act
eliminates joint and several liability between joint
tortfeasors. 163 The only exception is that a general avia-
tion manufacturer of an airframe is jointly and severally
liable with a manufacturer of a component installed in the
161 Id. at 45-46.
182 Id. at 46. "The manufacturer is still accountable for all the harm from a
defective product, except that part caused by the consumer's own conduct." Id.;
see also Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D.
Idaho 1976) (use of comparative responsibility in a strict liability case).
163 H.R. 1307, supra note 12, § 723(b)-(c).
(b) ... Except as provided in subsection (c), a defendant is severally
but not jointly liable in an action governed by this subtitle, and the
liability of any defendant in any such action shall be determined on
the basis of that defendant's proportionate share of responsibility
for the claimant's damages.
(c) ... In an action governed by this subtitle (1) a general aviation
manufacturer who is the builder or manufacturer of the airframe of
the general aviation aircraft involved is jointly and severally liable
for damages for harm caused by a defective system, component, sub-
assembly, or other part of that aircraft that the manufacturer in-
stalled or certified as part of the original type design for that aircraft;
and (2) a general aviation manufacturer who is the manufacturer of a
system or component of the general aviation aircraft involved is
jointly and severally liable for damages for harm caused by a defec-
tive subassembly or other part of that system or component.
Id. (headings omitted).
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aircraft if the harm is caused by the component.' 64 Cur-
rently, the general rule in most jurisdictions is that joint
tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for any nonap-
portionable injury to the plaintiff, regardless of whether
the defendants acted in concert. 165
The current rule is set out clearly in Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Hardee.166 The plaintiffs were rice farmers who used a
creek for irrigating their rice. 67 The defendants were oil
companies who allegedly polluted the creek, causing the
failure of the plaintiffs' rice crop. 168 The Fifth Circuit held
that jury instructions which provided that each defendant
must be the sole cause of the injury in order to be liable
were improper. 169 The court went on to say that if the
harm is incapable of being apportioned, then the joint
tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable.170
Enactment of this provision of the Act will provide
much welcome relief to the general aviation industry. No
longer will "deep pockets" be fully responsible for the en-
tire judgment if only partially responsible for the injury.
In reality the only change from the current law will be in
164 Id.
165 74 Am. JUR. 2d Torts § 62 (1974); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 879 (1977) (joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable if each is legal cause
of harm that can not be apportioned regardless of whether their conduct is con-
curring or consecutive). But see 74 AM. JUR. 2d Torts § 63 (1974) (joint liability not
recognized in some jurisdictions); Mitchell Realty Co. v. City of West Allis, 184
Wis. 352, 199 N.W. 390 (1924) (joint and several liability between joint
tortfeasors only as strictly necessary).
1- 189 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1951).
167 Id. at 206-207.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 211.
170 Id. at 212.
According to the great weight of authority where the concurrent or
successive acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently of each other, are in combination, the direct or proxi-
mate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either
is responsible for the whole injury ....
Id. at 212 (citation omitted). See also Browne v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 504 F.
Supp. 514 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (under California law joint tortfeasors are responsible
for entire amount of damages); Hart v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 276 N.W.2d 166
(Minn. 1979) (joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable).
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situations where a joint tortfeasor is someone other than a
manufacturer of a component, such as a pilot or repair
service. In situations where the injury is the result of the
airframe manufacturer's defect or the component manu-
facturer's, both will continue to be jointly and severally
liable. 7'
D. Statutes of Repose
Another highly controversial change made to existing
law by the Act is the adoption of a statute of repose appli-
cable to any general aviation accident. 72 The Act pre-
vents any actions for injuries or harms arising out of a
general aviation accident against a general aviation manu-
facturer if not brought within twelve years from the date
of sale or lease of the product.173 This provision does not
apply, however, to situations where the general aviation
manufacturer has expressly warranted that the product
life will exceed that provided for in the statute,"74 nor in
1' See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
,72 Statutes of repose prevent the creation of a cause of action beyond a speci-
fied period of time, unlike a statute of limitation which creates a requirement that
the cause of action be pursued within a specified time after it has accrued. Com-
ment, Statutes of Repose in Products Liability: Death Before Conception?, 37 Sw. L.J. 665,
666 (1983). H.R. 1307 and S. 640 also provide for a statute of limitation in gen-
eral aviation accidents of within two years from the general aviation accident. H.R.
1307, supra note 12, § 728 and S. 640, supra note 12, § 11. Statutes of limitation
are beyond the scope of this comment.
17s H.R. 1307, supra note 12, § 724.
No civil action for damages for harm arising out of a general aviation
accident which is brought against a general aviation manufacturer
may be brought for harm which is alleged to have been caused by an
aircraft or a system, component, subassembly, or other part of an
aircraft and which occurs more than -
(1) 12 years from -
(A) the date of delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser or
lessee, if delivered directly from the manufacturer, or
(B) the date of the first delivery of the aircraft to a person en-
gaged in the business of selling or leasing such an aircraft; or
(2) with respect to any system, component, subassembly, or other
part which replaced another product in, or which was added to, the
aircraft, and which is alleged to have caused the claimant's harm, 12
years from the date of the replacement or addition.
Id. The senate bill provides for a 20 year period. S. 640, supra note 12, § 7(a).
174 H.R. 1307, supra note 12, § 724(b).
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situations where the manufacturer becomes aware of a de-
fect after the sale of the product and fails to warn the
user.17 5
Statutes of repose were created in an attempt to deal
with the crisis of skyrocketing products liability Costs. 1 76
This otherwise unlimited "tail" of liability has caused
manufacturers and insurers to cry foul at their inability to
accurately fix the cost of liability to pass along to consum-
ers. 77 Proponents of statutes of repose point out the dif-
ficulty in defending an action based on a defect in a
product, or on a manufacturer's negligence, when the
product was manufactured many years prior to the date of
the injury. 77 Evidence crucial to the defense may have
long since disappeared.' 79 Furthermore, the product may
have suffered misuse over the years or may have been
modified, making liability more difficult to prove.18°
Opponents of statutes of repose have little sympathy
for the proponents' claims of difficulty of a defense when
a number of years have elapsed between the time of man-
ufacture and the injury. They point out that the burden of
proof in a products liability claim is always on the plain-
tiff.18  Furthermore, if it is difficult for the manufacturer
to go back a number of years to defend a product, it is just
as difficult for the plaintiff to go back as many years to
prove the manufacturer's negligence or the existence of a
defective product at the time of sale. 8 2 Opponents con-
tend that it is even more difficult for the plaintiff to over-
come this time barrier because of the presumption that if
the product has been performing safely for a number of
years, then it was not defective at the time it was sold. 8 3
175 Id. § 724(c).
176 Comment, supra note 172, at 675.
177 Id.
170 Id. at 676.
179 Id.
'so Id.
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Opponents of statutes of repose also point out the ap-
parent inconsistency between allowing statutes of repose
to prevent actions from arising and the recognition of the
doctrine of strict products liability. 8 4 The inconsistency
arises from the policy considerations of strict liability.
Specifically, strict products liability was created to provide
recovery to an injured plaintiff without the showing of cul-
pable conduct on the part of the manufacturer.' The
theory is that the manufacturer is in a better position to
bear the cost by passing it along to the consumer in the
form of increased prices. 8 6 Statutes of repose, however,
place this cost on the person least able to afford it, the
injured plaintiff.'8 7
Several states have already adopted various types of
statutes of repose for product liability actions.' 88 Some
statutes apply only to specific types of actions.' 89 Some
merely create a rebuttable presumption that the useful life
of the product has expired, 9° and some are specifically
excluded from application in certain circumstances.' 9'
Since inception, statutes of repose have come under fire
on three different constitutional theories: equal protec-
tion, due process, and right of access to the courts. 92
84 See supra notes 58-114 and accompanying text for a discussion of strict prod-
ucts liability.
111 See supra notes 58-114 and accompanying text for a discussion of strict prod-
ucts liability.
186 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c (1964). "[Plublic pol-
icy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended
for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost
of production against which liability insurance can be obtained." Id.
187 See Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 673 (Utah 1985).
188 See W. TURLEY, supra note 67, app. G (table of states that have adopted some
form of a statute of repose applicable to products liability). Many states have
adopted other forms of statutes of repose applying to either architects and engi-
neers or to medical malpractice cases. See generally McGovern, The Variety, Policy and
Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 579 (1981).
189 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-213(b) (Smith-Hurd 1984) (applies
only to actions in strict liability); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5 (Burns Supp. 1990)
(only applies to actions in strict liability or negligence).
- See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-1403(2) (1990).
19, See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(b) (1980) (statute does not apply to
asbestos claims).
192 Comment, supra note 172, at 684; see also McGovern, supra note 188, at 579
[56
The best opportunity to challenge a statute of repose is
under the guaranteed right of access to the courts found
in several state constitutions. 193  These state provisions
generally guarantee a plaintiff access to the courts of his
state. 194
In Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. ,195 the Supreme Court of
Utah invalidated a statute of repose on the grounds that it
violated the provision of the Utah Constitution that pro-
vided that all courts were open to all injured parties. 196
The action in Berry was brought in connection with the
crash of a twenty-three year old aircraft. 197 The court
held that Utah's open court provision restricted the legis-
lature's right to modify common law remedies without
providing for alternative remedies. 198 With a clear social
or economic evil present, the legislature can eliminate a
common law remedy only if the elimination is neither ar-
bitrary nor unreasonable.' 99 The court failed to find a
clear social or economic evil eliminated by the statute of
repose and thus ruled that it was unconstitutional. °°
Other state courts have ruled that statutes of repose do
not violate state constitutional provisions guaranteeing
access to the courts.20 1 In Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,202
(discussion of the various policy and constitutional issues surrounding statutes of
repose).
193 Comment, supra note 172, at 686-87.
- Id. at 687.
717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985).
' Id. at 683. The Utah Constitution provides that:
[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to
him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnec-
essary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or de-
fending before any tribunal in this state, by himself or counsel, any
civil cause to which he is a party.
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11.
197 Berry, 717 P.2d at 672. The Utah statute at issue prevented an action for any
product defects that did not result in injury within six years of the initial purchase
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the Indiana Supreme Court held that a statute of repose
was constitutional even though the Indiana Constitution
had an open court provision almost identical to the one
found in Berry. 05 The action in Dague was filed in connec-
tion with the crash of a thirteen year old aircraft. 2 ' The
court held that the plaintiff's cause of action was prohib-
ited by a statute of repose requiring actions for product
liability be brought within ten years of the date of the de-
livery of the product to the original consumer. 0 5 Unlike
the Berry court, the Dague court broadly construed the
powers of the legislature, finding that the legislature
could eliminate or modify common law rights or reme-
dies. °6 Furthermore, the court held that if the legislature
took away a common law right or remedy, there was no
obligation to provide an alternative remedy. 7
E. Punitive Damages
The Act provides for punitive damages in situations
where the harm incurred by the injured party directly re-
ton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 I1. App. 3d 722, 425 N.E.2d 522 (1981) (statute of
repose also held not to violate due process or equal protection).
2o2 275 Ind. 520, 418 N.E.2d 207 (1981).
203 Id. at 520, 418 N.E.2d at 213. The open court provision of the Indiana Con-
stitution states that "[a]ll courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done
to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law." IND. CONST. art. I, § 12.
Dague, 275 Ind. at 520, 418 N.E.2d at 209.
Id. at 520, 418 N.E.2d at 211. The statute in question mandates the
following:
[a]ny product liability action must be commenced within two years
after the cause of action accrues or within ten years after the delivery
of the product to the initial user or consumer; except that, if the
cause of action accrues more than eight years but not more than ten
years after the initial delivery, the action may be commenced at any
time within two years after the cause of action accrues.
IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5 (Bums Supp. 1989). The Indiana Supreme Court
decided that the legislature intended the "or" present within the phrase "action
accrues or within ten years" to be an "and." Dague, 275 Ind. at 520, 418 N.E.2d at
211.
2- Id. at 520, 418 N.E.2d at 213. "Both this Court and the United States
Supreme Court have upheld the right of states to abolish or modify the common
law." Id. (quoting Sidle v. Majors, 264 Ind. 206, 209, 341 N.E.2d 763, 766 (1976)).
207 Id.
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suits from conduct manifesting a conscious and flagrant
indifference to the safety of those persons who might be
harmed by the use of the general aviation aircraft.2 ° s In
order to recover punitive damages, the Act further pro-
vides that the claimant must meet the burden of proof
with clear and convincing evidence.20 9
Presently, most states permit the recovery of punitive
damages in situations where the conduct of the party
causing an injury is more reprehensible than ordinary tor-
tious conduct.21 0 Some states restrict the use of punitive
damages to those situations expressly authorized by stat-
ute. 2 1 Punitive damages are intended to punish the
wrongdoer for its reprehensible behavior and further to
deter the wrongdoer and others from future harmful
conduct. 1
Various standards are utilized by different states to de-
termine whether the conduct of the party is sufficient to
award punitive damages.21 3 Some standards are statuto-
- H.R. 1307, supra note 12, § 727(a).
20 Id.
2o DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS, § 40.21 at 40-76 (1989); see also Kritser v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973) (punitive damages allowable in
wrongful death action under Texas law against aircraft manufacturer); Piper Air-
craft Corp. v. Coulter, 426 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (punitive dam-
ages allowable in a products liability claim against an aircraft manufacturer);
Walter v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 121 Wis. 2d 221, 358 N.W.2d 816 (Wis. Ct. App.
1984) (punitive damages allowable in strict liability or negligence claim against
aircraft manufacturer for design defect); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908
(1977);J. GHIARDI &J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE, § 4.19 at
40 (Supp. 1990) (summary of states' positions on allowance of punitive damages).
211 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (Supp. 1989) (no punitive damages
unless otherwise allowed by statute); Boott Mills v. Boston & M. R. R., 218 Mass.
582, 106 N.E. 680 (1914) (punitive damages only awarded by express statute);
Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank of Tampa, 96 Wash. 2d 409, 635 P.2d 441 (1981)
(punitive damages are not allowed unless expressly authorized by legislature).
212 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1977); see also Chrysler Corp. v.
Wolmer, 499 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1986) (punitive damages are imposed to punish
wrongdoer and to deter others from similar activity); Snowden v. Osborne, 269
So. 2d 858 (Miss. 1972) (punitive damages are granted to punish wrongdoer and
to set an example so that others may be deterred from committing similar of-
fenses); O'Donnell v. K-Mart Corp., 100 A.D.2d 488, 474 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1984)
(purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter a defendant and to deter
others from committing similar acts).
215 The Restatement allows punitive damages "for conduct that is outrageous, be-
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rily imposed. 214  Others are imposed by the courts. 2 15
The Act imposes the standard of "a conscious and fla-
grant indifference to the safety of those persons who
might be harmed by the use of the general aviation air-
craft" in order to recover punitive damages.21 6
The legislative histories of the Act and S. 640 shed little
light on whether the standard of "a conscious and flagrant
indifference to the safety" is the same as those standards
currently in use in the different states. 17 The standards
generally in current use include fraud, ill will, malicious-
ness, wantonness, recklessness, oppressiveness, and the
reckless disregard for the rights of others.21 8 Mere negli-
gence, however, was not contemplated by the drafters as
providing grounds for recovery of punitive damages. 19
cause of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of
others." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1977).
214 See, e.g., ALA. CODE. § 6-11-20(a) (Supp. 1990) (recovery of punitive dam-
ages when the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression,
fraud, wantonness, or malice); CAL. CIv. CODE § 3295 (West Supp. 1988) (recov-
ery of punitive damages when the defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud or mal-
ice); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925 (1989) (punitive damages recoverable if the
defendant has shown wanton disregard for the health, safety and welfare of
others); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (recov-
ery of exemplary damages when injury results from fraud, malice, or gross
negligence).
2,5 See, e.g., Smith v. Chapman, 115 Ariz. 211, 564 P.2d 900 (1977) (punitive
damages awarded for acts done with bad motive or with reckless indifference to
the rights of others); Wagman v. Lee, 457 A.2d 401 (D.C. 1983) (punitive dam-
ages may be awarded when the defendant's conduct is accompanied by fraud, ill
will, recklessness, wantonness, oppressiveness, willful disregard for the plaintiff's
rights or other circumstances tending to aggravate), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849
(1983); Hall v. American Airlines, 1 Haw. App. 258, 617 P.2d 1230 (1980) (de-
fendant's wrongful act must be done willfully, wantonly or maliciously, or charac-
terized by some aggravating circumstances to subject it to punitive damages);
Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382 (Ky. 1985) (punitive
damages are awarded for defendant's outrageous conduct).
2 ,6H.R. 1307, supra note 12, § 727(a).
217 S. 640 actually provides for a standard of "conscious, flagrant indifference
.S. 640, supra note 12, § 10(a). The replacement of "and" in H.R. 1307 with
a comma in S. 640 does not appear to create a different interpretation of the
provision between the two bills. The committee report on H.R. 1307 from the
House Committee on Public Works and Transportation does not provide any
assistance in the interpretation of the standard.
2138 See sources cited supra notes 213-215.
213 S. REP. No. 223, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1989).
Since the standards in current use are often defined in a
manner similar to the standard found in the Act, the im-
position of "a conscious and flagrant indifference" stan-
dard should cause no change to the present substantive
law. 220
The imposition in the Act of a clear and convincing bur-
den of proof standard for imposing punitive damages will
change the law in some jurisdictions. Many states already
employ a clear and convincing standard for imposing pu-
nitive damages. 22 1 The rationale behind such a standard
is the relationship between punitive damages and criminal
punishment. 2 Other states, however, continue to use
the general civil standard of a preponderance of the evi-
dence as the burden of proof required to recover punitive
damages.23
The Act also addresses the admission of financial evi-
dence in order to determine the amount of punitive dam-
ages necessary to punish the wrongdoer. Specifically, the
Act provides that financial information regarding the de-
fendant cannot be admitted until the claimant establishes
that it can present evidence establishing prima facie proof
of conduct allowing the recovery of punitive damages.22 4
220 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(c)(1) (West Supp. 1990) (malice includes conduct
carried on by the defendant which is a willful and conscious disregard of the rights
and safety of others); TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001(5) (Vernon
1990) (gross negligence includes an actual conscious indifference to the rights,
safety, or welfare of the person affected).
221 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a) (Supp. 1990); CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294(a)
(West Supp. 1990); KAN. CIv. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-3701(c) (Vernon Supp.
1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(5) (1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925(1)
(1988); see also Deshmukh v. Cook, 630 F. Supp. 956, 960-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1986);
Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 152 Ariz. 490, 490, 733 P.2d 1073, 1088, cert. denied,
484 U.S. 874 (1987); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 260, 294
N.W.2d 437, 457 (1980).
222 See, e.g., Deshmukh, 630 F. Supp. at 960-61; Hawkins, 152 Ariz. at 490, 733
P.2d at 1087; Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 260, 294 N.W.2d at 457.
22 See, e.g., Holmes v. Hollingsworth, 234 Ark. 347, 352 S.W.2d 96 (1961);
Johnson v. Stackhouse Oldsmobile, Inc., 27 Ohio St. 2d 140, 271 N.E.2d 782
(1971); Howard v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 271 S.C. 238, 246 S.E.2d 880 (1978).
224 H.R. 1307, supra note 12, § 727(b). The Act provides the following:
[Elvidence regarding the financial worth of a defendant or the de-
fendant's profits or any other financial evidence relating solely to a
claim for punitive damages under this subtitle is not admissible un-
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Most states presently allow the admission of financial
evidence concerning the defendant for the determination
of punitive damages.225 Some allow the evidence during
trial after the claimant has made a prima facie showing
that the claimant is entitled to punitive damages, while
others only allow the admission of the evidence after the
defendant has been held responsible for punitive
damages .226
Admitting evidence of the defendant's wealth raises two
obvious concerns. First, the evidence may have a prejudi-
cial effect on the trier of fact during the determination of
liability and, second, it is an invasion of privacy into what
typically are confidential affairs.227 The drafters of the
Act, along with some states, believe that requiring a plain-
tiff to prove a prima facie right to punitive damages prior
less the claimant establishes, before any such evidence is offered,
that the claimant can present evidence that will establish prima facie
proof of conduct manifesting a conscious and flagrant indifference
to the safety of those persons who might be harmed by use of the
general aviation aircraft involved.
Id. S. 640 also provides that if the harm incurred is death and the applicable state
law only provides for punitive damages, then the claimant does not have to meet
the requirements of § 10(a) in order to collect punitive damages under state law.
S. 640, supra note 12, § 10(c).
225 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908 comment e (1977). But see
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(6) (1989) (evidence of the income or net worth of a
party shall not be admitted to establish the amount of punitive damages).
226 See, e.g. ALA. CODE § 6-11-23(b) (Supp. 1990) (in all cases where a verdict for
punitive damages is awarded, on motion of a party, the court shall hear evidence
on the amount of punitive damages including the economic impact on the defend-
ant); CAL. CIv. CODE § 3295(a) (West Supp. 1990) (court may grant the defendant
a protective order requiring the claimant to show a prima facie case for punitive
damages prior to allowing financial information about the defendant into evi-
dence); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7)(a) (1989) (after return of a verdict the
jury shall determine the amount of punitive damages taking into consideration the
defendant's financial affairs, financial condition and net worth); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 30.925(2) (1988) (during course of a trial, evidence concerning the defendant's
ability to pay shall not be admitted until the claimant establishes a prima facie
right to recover punitive damages); see also Gierman v. Toman, 77 N.J. Super. 18,
185 A.2d 241 (Law Div. 1962) (orderly procedure requires that a prima facie right
to recover punitive damages must be shown prior to the disclosure of the wealth
of the defendant); Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121 (Wyo. 1981) (the jury may
hear evidence of the defendant's financial status after they have returned a verdict
for punitive damages).
227 Campen, 635 P.2d at 1127-28.
to the admission of evidence concerning the defendant's
wealth, protects the defendant against the needless inva-
sion of privacy and prejudice on the part of the trier of
fact. This standard, however, does not protect the de-
fendant to the extent that an exclusion until after liability
has been found would. Once a plaintiff makes a prima fa-
cie case, the defendant still has an opportunity to rebut
the plaintiff's case. Under the standard established by the
Act, financial evidence is submitted prior to a finding of
liability on the part of the defendant, thus impacting the
liability decision of the trier of fact and possibly requiring
the needless disclosure of private information by the de-
fendant. The standard established by the Act eases the
burden on plaintiffs by making it easier to prove punitive
damages by allowing potentially prejudicial evidence to
reach the trier of fact prior to a decision on liability. The
burden on the defendant is also increased to the extent
the defendant will have to furnish confidential financial in-
formation prior to any finding of liability for punitive
damages.
F. Jurisdiction and Venue
The Act provides for concurrent federal and state sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over general aviation accidents, re-
gardless of the amount in controversy.22 8 Presently a
federal court can try a general aviation accident case only
if the parties in the action are residents of different states
and the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000.229 None
of the plaintiffs and defendants (if more than one) may be
228 H.R. 1307, supra note 12, § 729(a). "The district courts of the United States,
concurrently with the State courts, shall have original jurisdiction, without regard
to the amount in controversy, in all actions governed by section 722 [general pro-
visions relating to liability] and in all actions for indemnity or contribution de-
scribed in section 723(d) of this subtitle." Id.
229 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988). "The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $50,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different
States;..." Id. Other statutes granting jurisdiction to federal courts are 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (admiralty and prize
jurisdiction).
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residents of the same state.2 3  A corporation is consid-
ered a resident of a state if it is incorporated in the state
or its principal place of business is located in the state.23 '
Due to the nature of aircraft accidents and the subsequent
suits, the diversity requirement is probably met in most
cases brought currently; thus, this change will likely have
little impact on the current system.23 2
The Act also allows removal of an action from a state
court to a federal district court at the discretion of any
defendant. 3 3 This provision mirrors the present law.234
Although not changing present law, the combination of
this provision with the provision that federal district
courts will always have original jurisdiction provides the
230 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
2s, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). "[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of
any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its prin-
cipal place of business ...." Id. Two approaches are used to determine a corpo-
ration's principal place of business. See Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284
F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1960) (principal place of business of a corporation is the loca-
tion where the primary day to day activities of the corporation take place); Scot
Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (principal
place of business of a corporation is the nerve center of the corporation, where
the officers and directors coordinate and direct the activities of the corporation).
2- 2 Since aircraft manufacturers are headquartered and incorporated in rela-
tively few states and aircraft by nature are distributed widely, the odds are that in
any given accident, diversity will exist between the plaintiff and the defendants. In
order for a state court, or a federal court within a particular state, to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the nonresident must have
sufficient contacts within the jurisdiction. International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945). The Act has no effect on the requirements of personal
jurisdiction.
2- H.R. 1307, supra note 12, § 729(b).
A civil action which is brought in a State court may be removed to
the district court of the United States for the district embracing the
place where the action is pending, without the consent of any other
party and without regard to the amount in controversy, by any de-
fendant against whom a claim in the action is asserted for damages
for harm arising out of a general aviation accident.
Id.
2Id See 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts
of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by
the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United




defendant with unlimited control over whether the case is
tried in state court or federal court. Any advantages
which might exist in state court for the plaintiff are easily
circumvented by the defendant's request for removal,
which the judge has no choice but to allow.23 5
The Act also provides federal courts with pendent juris-
diction to hear state law claims arising out of a general
aviation accident if a "substantial question of fact" is com-
mon to both the state and federal claims.23 6 Present law
gives federal courts pendent jurisdiction to decide state
law claims if the state and federal claims arise out of a
"common nucleus of operative fact.12 7 The present stan-
dard and the one proposed by the Act appear to be the
same.
Like pendent jurisdiction, the provisions of the Act re-
lating to venue are essentially the same as those that cur-
rently exist. Under the Act, venue will exist in a district
court if the claim arose within the district, or any plaintiff
or defendant resides within the district.2 38 A corporation
is deemed a resident of any state in which it is incorpo-
rated, licensed to do business, or is actually doing busi-
ness. 239 Furthermore, an action can be transferred to any
other district, upon motion of any party or on the court's
motion, "for the convenience of parties and witnesses in
the interest of justice. ' 240 Present law provides for the
2 3 See W. TURLEY, supra note 67, § 10.01 (general discussion of the advantages
and disadvantages of bringing suit in federal court versus those found by bringing
suit in state court).
2s6 H.R. 1307 supra note 12, § 729(c).
In any case commenced in or removed to a district court under sub-
section (a) or (b), the court shall have jurisdiction to determine all
claims under State law that arise out of the same general aviation
accident if a substantial question of fact is common to the claims
under State law and to the Federal claim, defense, or counterclaim.
Id.
27 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
238 H.R. 1307 supra note 12, § 729(d). "A civil action in which the district courts
have jurisdiction under subsection (a) may be brought only in a district in which
the accident giving rise to the claim occurred; or any plaintiff or defendant re-
sides." Id.
2-19 Id. § 729(d)(3).
240 Id. § 729(d)(2).
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same result. 24'
IV. CONCLUSION
No one involved in the general aviation industry would
argue that a plaintiff injured due to the fault of a general
aviation manufacturer should not be compensated. The
Act does not prevent recovery by deserving plaintiffs.
Since the advent of strict liability, the balance on the
scales of liability has been disproportionately on the side
of the plaintiff with an obvious effect on the general avia-
tion industry. The Act merely shifts this balance toward
equilibrium.
The Act does not prevent recovery in a general aviation
accident from a party that is liable under current law.242
Nor does the Act place a limit on the amount of damages
a plaintiff may be awarded, or on the amount of attorneys'
fees that may be awarded. The Act merely attempts to
limit the liability of a general aviation manufacturer to
those situations where, through fault of the manufacturer,
its product causes an injury. By limiting this liability to a
fixed period and a fixed number of situations, insurers can
accurately predict the liability cost of a product, thus re-
ducing the cost of insurance. By reducing the cost of in-
surance, the cost of aircraft will decline, with the resulting
impact felt in all phases of the economy.
The policy reasons for strict liability are twofold: (1) to
compensate the injured, and (2) to place the burden of
risk on those who can best protect against it.2 43 Nothing
in the Act is designed to prevent the compensation of de-
serving, injured plaintiffs. Nor does the Act shift the en-
tire burden of risk onto the plaintiff. The general aviation
manufacturer still has to insure that it has not negligently
designed or manufactured its product and that it is using
state of the art technology in its manufacture and design
24, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a), (c), 1404(a).
242 See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
243 See supra notes 58-114 and accompanying text.
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of the product.24 4
Furthermore, the users of general aviation products ar-
guably should absorb some of the risks associated with fly-
ing themselves, through insurance or otherwise. The
typical user of general aviation products is generally not
the poor defenseless consumer needing the overabun-
dance of protection provided by the current state of liabil-
ity laws. Flying is not completely risk-free, and those
participating in it should be forced to bear some of the
risk of their participation.
Also, under the Act the manufacturer continues to have
an incentive to design and manufacture a safe product. If
the manufacturer fails to do so, the laws of the market-
place will come into play and no one will be willing to
purchase an unsafe aircraft. Furthermore, the manufac-
turer is constrained by the rules and regulations of the
FAA. The general aviation industry is one of the most
highly regulated industries in the United States.
Although FAA guidelines are only minimums, they are
designed to insure a safe aircraft.
The policy arguments favoring the consumer of general
aviation products are on one side of the scale while on the
other side are the prohibitive liability costs and the impact
they have on the general aviation industry. Although Con-
gress' inaction prevented the passage of the Act during
the 101st session, undoubtedly the aviation industry will
try again during the 102nd Congress. Congress will then
have another chance to bring stability and hope to an in-
dustry still mired in the recession of the 1970s.
244 See supra notes 35-141 and accompanying text.
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